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Chapter 10
How to Make the Market for
Financial Advice Work
Andreas Hackethal and Roman Inderst
The regulation of the financial industry is changing rapidly. In order to
effect far-reaching protection of retail financial consumers, the newly
created Financial Stability Board in Europe has made several proposals to
advance consumer finance protection, including the establishment of a
dedicated consumer protection authority (FSB, 2011). Such an authority
has also been newly created in the United States, in the form of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau operating since July 2011. In the
United Kingdom, the former Financial Services Authority will be replaced by
a Financial Conduct Authority (FSA, 2011). A key motivation behind these
changes is that the system of financial advice is seen to be profoundly
deficient. Rather than helping consumers by bridging gaps in knowledge
and facilitating transactions, professional financial advice stands accused of
helping to exploit consumers’ lack of financial literacy and inexperience.
In its blueprint for a new architecture of financial regulation, the US
Department of the Treasury (2009: 68) has put this as follows:
Impartial advice represents one of the most important financial services consumers
can receive [ . . . ] Mortgage brokers often advertise their trustworthiness as advisors
on difficult mortgage decisions. When these intermediaries accept side payments
from product providers, they can compromise their ability to be impartial. Con-
sumers, however, may retain faith that the intermediary is working for them and
placing their interests above his or her own, even if the conflict of interest is
disclosed. Accordingly, in some cases consumers may reasonably but mistakenly
rely on advice from conflicted intermediaries.
This conjecture of a malfunctioning and therefore welfare-impairing
market for financial advice is echoed by the European Commission’s
(EC, 2011: 27) recast proposal for a directive on markets in financial
instruments (MiFID II):
The continuous relevance of personal recommendations for clients and the increasing
complexity of services and instruments require enhancing the conduct of business
obligations in order to strengthen the protection of investors. [ . . . ] In order to give all
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relevant information to investors, it is appropriate to require investment firms provid-
ing investment advice to clarify the basis of the advice they provide, notably the range
of products they consider in providing personal recommendations to clients, whether
they provide investment advice on an independent basis and whether they provide the
clients with the on-going assessment of the suitability of the financial instruments
recommended to them. [ . . . ] In order to strengthen the protection of investors and
increase clarity to clients as to the service they receive, it is appropriate to further
restrict the possibility for firms to accept or receive inducements from third parties,
and particularly from issuers or product providers, when providing the service of
investment advice on an independent basis and the service of portfolio management.
In this chapter, we contend that financial advice is key to improving the
quality of investment decisions of retail investors. As consumers often have
deficient financial literacy or may be prone to make systematic errors, well-
informed and unbiased financial advice has an important role to play.
Here, we discuss this with particular attention to retail investment services.
Recent survey evidence shows that retail investors typically turn to and
receive professional advice. While this may complement the knowledge of
more educated consumers, we show that the impact of advice may be
particularly large for less-knowledgeable consumers.
But do consumers make the right use of financial advice? We argue that
this may often not be the case. One reason is that—as suggested in the
preceding quotes—they may fail to understand the underlying inherent
conflicts of interest. We discuss empirical and theoretical papers that show
how such a system of biased advice may persist in the marketplace. But we
also show that consumers may wrongly use even unbiased advice.
Throughout this chapter we focus on advice given specifically to particu-
lar consumers, rather than being provided generically, for example,
through investment newsletters or analyst reports. Also, for the present
discussion, we refer to financial advice or a financial advisor, without
singling out particular roles and professions and thereby the particular
legal obligations that would apply to each. Accordingly, general remarks
about the role and scope of financial advice should apply equally to
dedicated investment advisors or broker-dealers whose advice is legally
considered to be ‘solely incidental’ to their business.1
The financial investment problem
One reason why the decision problem of retail investors is complex is
simply the staggering number of different products.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/9/2013, SPi
214 The Market for Retirement Financial Advice
Complexity of investment decision and systematic errors
Lack of transparency allows for significant price dispersion even for rela-
tively simple products, such as S&P 500 index funds.2 Moreover, many
retail investment products are quite complex, involving derivative struc-
tures or various hidden costs that an investor must carefully add up and
compare before making a decision. Another reason for complexity is the
very nature of household investment decisions. Theory posits that investors
maximize subjective expected utility under a life-time budget constraint,
given stochastic labor income and asset returns (Campbell and Viceira,
2002). Investors should formulate dynamic optimal plans for consumption
and portfolio composition, but in practice the optimization problem is far
from easy. Little is known about how consumers actually search for invest-
ment products, and the realization of state variables relevant for optimal
portfolio composition. Several recent studies suggest, however, that con-
sumers seem to conduct only a very limited search, often collecting infor-
mation only from a single source.3 One would suspect that this involves
their most trusted financial advisor. To what extent the presence of the
advisor then stimulates information acquisition, or whether it instead stalls
this process, has unfortunately not yet been the subject of research.
When making investment decisions in practice, the informed consumer
should consider a number of different steps. He would first assess his
personal balance sheet to determine how much he is already exposed to
different classes of risk and to what extent he can afford to save and invest
for the long term. This then feeds into his risk tolerance and his investment
horizon. The next step is to save and invest optimally across different asset
classes, thereby achieving diversification as well as an optimal trade-off
between expected return, risk, and illiquidity. It then remains to pick
individual securities and to undertake the respective transactions. Over
time, the investor will also need to review his decisions in light of shocks,
and he should also potentially readjust his decisions.
The academic literature has suggested numerous instances how at least
some consumers are prone to make systematic errors along this process.4
The key obstacles to making good decisions include unstable or undefined
preferences, heuristic decision-making (narrow) framing or unsuitable
anchoring of expectations, inertia and procrastination, overconfidence,
and choice and information overload.5 Moreover, systematic errors may
stem from misconceptions about how financial products or financial
markets work—or from a failure to adequately conceive risk. This is
where professional advice can have a major role to play. Advisors should
improve the quality of investor decisions along the five steps of the generic
investment process sketched out above. At its best, this process will match
people with their optimal portfolios throughout time.6
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Consumers’ financial capability
Financial capability refers to the knowledge and skills to make financial
(investment) decisions to promote a consumer’s interests. Several recent
studies suggest that many households do not possess a sufficient level of
financial capability, given the complexity of the decisions they face.7 Surveys
suggest that many adults lack even basic knowledge of financial products
and concepts, such as inflation or risk, essential to make well-informed and
self-directed decisions, and to validate the recommendations.
This lack of knowledge is clearly not uniform across the whole popula-
tion: better-educated households (as well as wealthier ones) tend to be
more capable, while very young adults show a particular lack of knowledge.
It is at best unclear whether gaps in financial capability can be overcome
by better financial education. Some studies based on, for instance, the
provision of financial literacy courses in high schools or within employer-
sponsored programs, have suggested that any benefits may be short lived,
but others come to the opposite conclusion.8 If this is the case, then this
clearly strengthens the importance of professional financial advice.
The unfulfilled promise of advice
There is considerable scope for professional financial advice to help con-
sumers make better decisions, and retail financial consumers do frequently
seek and receive advice. In a large online survey among recent purchasers
of investment products in Europe, nearly 80 percent made their purchase
in a face-to-face setting, mostly with an employee of the investment pro-
vider or a professional advisor (Chater et al., 2010).9 Almost 60 percent
reported that their choice was directly influenced by the advisor. The size
of the US market for financial planning and advice was estimated to be
almost $44 billion in 2011.10
Several studies have documented that the probability of seeking
financial advice increases with age, education, financial literacy, wealth,
and income.11 Moreover, women are more likely to seek advice than men.
Older and more educated people are presumably more confident and able
to combine different views than younger people, and higher wealth or
income warrants greater search costs and comes with greater opportunity
cost of time. Women may be less overconfident than men and therefore
place higher weight on the opinion of an advisor. Even if less sophisticated
consumers seek little advice, those that do might nevertheless tend to rely
on just a single source of advice. For instance, Hackethal et al. (2010)
report that less-knowledgeable advisory customers of a large German
bank relied more on the financial advice received than most financially
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skilled customers, which then translated into significant differences in
investment and trading behavior between the two groups. In fact, custom-
ers who relied heavily on the specific advisor assigned to them tended to
have over 20 percent higher turnover in their financial assets, after control-
ling for a number of characteristics such as portfolio value and general
education. Hence, these accounts generated higher bank revenues than
customers who adhered less closely to advisor recommendations. In Euro-
pean survey data, Georgarakos and Inderst (2010) show that trust in
financial advice was a significant determinant of the willingness to hold
risky assets among less educated households or households who found
financial decisions more complex, and to a much lesser degree for more
educated and more confident households.12 Taken together, these studies
suggest heterogeneity of financial consumers, one group relying strongly
on recommendations of a trusted financial advisor, and another which
makes self-determined decisions.
While financial advice can play an important role in consumer invest-
ment decisions, in some cases consumers may not benefit from the rela-
tionship. For instance, they might have better diversified portfolios, but
these portfolios may not have lower turnover or higher performance
(Hackethal et al., 2012). One reason is that advice may not be disinterested
and consumers fail to adequately take this into account. A well-functioning
market of financial advice would ensure that the self-interest of advisors is
sufficiently aligned with that of their customers. Often, the compensation
of financial intermediaries creates distorted incentives, as it rather aligns
the interests of a particular ‘high-fee’ product provider with those of the
‘advisor-salesman.’ Yet consumers may often be ignorant about such pay-
ments, or they may not become salient at the time of purchase.
The US Federal Trade Commission’s staff report (Lacko and Pappalardo,
2007) on disclosure rules for mortgage brokers suggests that many indivi-
duals view such brokers as trusted advisors who shop for the best loans for
their clients. In a survey of recent purchasers of financial products, Chater
et al. (2010) find that most respondents are largely ignorant of conflicts of
interest. More than half of all respondents believed that financial advisors or
the staff of a tied provider gave fully independent advice or information.
Studies of investors’ reactions to analysts’ recommendations also suggest that
at least some investors are naı̈ve about analysts’ incentives.13 In addition,
experimental evidence suggests that some subjects are willing to follow
advice rather blindly.14 When consumers are insufficiently wary about con-
flicts of interest, there is scope for financial advice to generate consumer
detriment, rather than helping them with their decisions. With respect to
investment services, consumers might then inadvertently purchase products
with excessive fees or churn their portfolios too often.
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Self-interested financial advice may also risk aggravating systematic mis-
takes that some consumers are prone to make. Mullainathan et al. (2010)
used mystery shopping in the United States to test how investment advisors
reacted to consumers at their first encounter. Results showed that, at a first
meeting, investment advisors seemed not to risk arguing against potential
customers’ misperceptions. Rather than mitigating potential errors, they
could even amplify biases and misperceptions.
We summarize this discussion by illustrating how advice can help or
harm retail investors by either bridging or exploiting ignorance, and
through either mitigating or exploiting systematic errors. There are four
possible configurations in the market for financial advice, depending on
(a) whether conflicts of interest exist between adviser and customer; and
(b) different customer characteristics (see Table 10.1). Situations 1 and 2
describe the possible configurations when the interests are aligned
between adviser and customer. Situation 3 probably has different policy
implications than 4. Situation 3 calls for more transparency on the effective
cost of advice, whereas Situation 4 rather calls for better information on the
outcome of investment and advisor activity over time.
Yet, even unbiased professional advice may fail to create benefits when
consumers do not make appropriate use of advice or when they simply do
not adhere to the recommendations. A consumer who expects a financial
advisor to provide him with ‘tips on hot stocks’ may turn away from the
advisor who, instead, educates him about the benefits of diversification. As
yet, there is only limited evidence about how consumers actually make use
of financial advice.15 In a randomized field experiment with a large broker-
age, Bhattacharya et al. (2012a) found that investors whose portfolio struc-
ture and trading behavior suggested that they were in the greatest need for
financial advice were, in fact, least likely to obtain it. And investors who
obtained advice hardly followed the recommendations. Moreover, adher-
ence to these recommendations would have significantly improved port-
folio efficiency, compared to what investors actually achieved after
Table 10.1 Four possible configurations in the market for financial advice
Consumer with limited
financial capability
Consumer with systematic
misperceptions
Interests between
advisor and
consumer aligned
(1) Advisor bridges
knowledge gap (products,
providers, fees, etc.)
(2) Advisor educates consumer about
systematic errors (home bias,
overconfidence, etc.)
Conflict of interest
between advisor and
consumer
(3) Advisor hides fees or
risks
(4) Advisor exploits misperceptions
(portfolio churning, attention-driven
trading, etc.)
Source : Authors’ tabulations.
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receiving the advice. This suggests that advice can, in principle, improve
retail investor decision-making, though demand-side obstacles must be
overcome to reap the potential benefits from advice.
Some obstacles include overconfidence regarding one’s own financial
capabilities relative to advisor capabilities, general distrust in the quality of
advice resulting in only selective adherence, or ignorance of portfolio
selection in conjunction with unavailability of information to accurately
assess the expected benefits from following the advice. A straightforward
policy implication of the low adherence to good advice is that policies
focusing on the supply side of the market for financial advice and, in
particular, on the inputs to an organization of advice might reduce the
occurrence of situations of Types 3 and 4 in Table 10.1, yet then might not
be sufficient to significantly increase consumer benefits from advice even
in situations of Types 1 and 2. How can consumers find out ex post facto
whether and to what extent conflicts of interests (ex ante disclosed)
translate into impaired welfare? How can consumers assess whether the
improvements in decision-making from unconflicted advice cover the cost
of advice? How can consumers compare proven quality of advice among
different conflicted or unconflicted suppliers? Answers to these questions
demand further research.
Possibly useful policy responses might put consumers into a position to,
first, assess their own needs for advice and, second, to anticipate the
expected outcomes of advice from different suppliers. In the next section,
we discuss current regulatory approaches and possible alternatives.
How to enhance the market for financial advice
Several policies can seek to reduce the need for financial advice, for
instance, by improving the quality of information that consumers can
gather and digest themselves. Standards for mandatory disclosure, such
as key product documents, also fall into this category. Moreover, profes-
sional advice also becomes less of a necessity when products themselves
become simpler. Policies that grant preferred tax status (say for retirement
accounts) to only a preapproved range of savings and investment products
would also meet this aim. Yet even simple financial products which most
financial economists would judge to be beneficial for retail investors by
construction could lose their built-in benefits in the hands of the average
consumer.
As an example, Bhattacharya et al. (2012b) analyze what happens when
retail investors replace single stocks and actively managed mutual funds
with low-cost index-linked instruments such as exchange-traded funds and
index funds. They report that the positive effects from better portfolio
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diversification are fully offset by negative abnormal returns from increased
factor timing activity. As discussed previously, consumer education would
further reduce the need for professional advice, though some studies
suggest that the impact might be short lived. The gap between existing
financial literacy levels in the population and what is needed in light of the
growing complexity of financial decision-making might simply be too large
to be bridged by (costly) training measures.
An alternative approach to improve the quality of financial advice is to
give advisors appropriate incentives to provide unbiased advice. The evi-
dence cited above suggests that some consumers may fail to rightly antici-
pate that advisors receive contingent payments or, if that is disclosed, the
incentive conflicts that such payments may engender are not salient at the
time of purchase. Such naı̈veté can lead to an outcome where consumers
mostly or exclusively pay indirectly for advice, throughmarkups on product
prices that are passed on to advisors through commissions, rather than
through a direct fee for advice (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a). Individual
firms may also have insufficient incentives to explain the resulting biases
and implement a system that does not compromise the efficiency of the
advice, as consumers’ inflated beliefs through biased advice tend to relax
competition.
If such a description applies to particular products or channels of distri-
bution, mandatory disclosure of conflicts of interest would seem warranted.
Moreover, the experimental evidence in Chater et al.’s report (2010)
suggests that such disclosure must be in a format such that it acts as a
strong ‘eye-opener’—and even then it may not prove sufficiently salient.
However, when transparency succeeds, this can also have unwanted conse-
quences. Loewenstein et al. (2011) show that, under disclosure, advisors
seem to feel more comfortable giving biased advice, and advisees seem to
adhere more to the advice given to avoid signaling outright distrust in the
advisor. This may not be the case with a cap or even a ban on certain
contingent fees, though these could also lead to market distortions. In
particular, when consumers are wary about the implications that contin-
gent payments can have on the services that advisors perform, interfering
with the structure and level of these payments may lead to inefficiencies.
Commissions and other performance-based sales inducements may serve
important functions, for example, as they steer advice to the most efficient
product or generate incentives for customer acquisition and information
gathering.16
Accordingly, policymakers would do well to establish to what extent
different groups of consumers are unaware of the prevailing inducement
structure and the implied conflicts of interest, or whether they fail to
distinguish between advice given by professionals with vastly different
fiduciary responsibilities. Next, it must be asked whether mandatory
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disclosure would backfire, such as benefitting arrangements where con-
flicts of interest are less visible (e.g., through vertical integration). Certain
arrangements may also prove to be efficient in a second-best sense, for
example, if they solve agency problems in a setting where the agent per-
forms different tasks and advises on the products of multiple providers.17
Creating transparency in the market for advice
How can a consumer who receives investment advice assess whether the
advice received was good or poor? Very sophisticated consumers might be
able to do so almost immediately, through validating an advisor’s recom-
mendation or even probing him with their own questions. For such con-
sumers, of course, the advisor will only be one source of information, or
they may merely be interested in having a facilitator for their transactions.
Instead, less financially sophisticated consumers may have to look at the
outcome of advice to judge how good it was. Yet for many financial prod-
ucts this may be far in the future. There may also be little that can be done
to correct an initially bad decision, for example, in the case of certain life
insurance policies that can only be redeemed at a high cost. If the invest-
ment is in marketable securities, consumers can, in principle, regularly
observe the outcome of their decisions and can adjust them by changing
their portfolio allocations.
At least in principle, consumers could then also establish whether a
recommended investment yielded a high or low return, or even how
volatile its market price was over, say, the last year. They could then
establish whether the investment indeed proved to be as risky as indicated
in a recommendation and whether, say, compared to a benchmark, the
earned return net of costs was commensurate with the risk. Note that an
advisor need not be a talented ‘stock-picker’ but he may be able to create
‘alpha’ for the consumer simply by avoiding fees and assessing the relative
riskiness of particular products.
So much for what is possible in principle! In reality, however, most retail
investors lack the information that would be necessary even for assessing the
riskiness of their current portfolios—and even when they can learn such
information, they may not be able to process it appropriately. Koestner
(2012) analyzes individual trading behavior of some 20,000 self-directed
retail investors over a period of eight years, to measure whether investors
who do not quit trading altogether learn from past mistakes. He finds that
under-diversification and the disposition effect do not abate as investors gain
trading experience.18 More trading experience is associated with less future
portfolio turnover, driving down transaction costs and raising net returns
over time. Transaction costs are possibly more salient to retail investors than
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idiosyncratic risk share and timing patterns in round-trip transactions. These
findings suggest that retail investors will improve risk management only if
they obtain salient information on the risk and return profile of their
portfolios.
Figure 10.1 suggests that (portfolio) risk management can offer substan-
tial potential for improvement. The left panel shows average actual port-
folio risk for self-directed customers of Financial Institution 1 (a German
online brokerage firm). When opening an investment account with this
brokerage, each customer reports the desired risk level for his portfolio,
where Category 1 denotes very low risk and Category 5 denotes very high
risk. It is clear that there is no monotonic relation between the clients’
desired risk category and actual portfolio return variation. Customers who
stated that they preferred very low risk levels achieved actual portfolio risk
comparable to investors who stated they had very high risk tolerance.
Financial Institution 1 did not report past portfolio risk nor past port-
folio returns to its customers; the same is true for most German retail
financial institutions. This implies that customers will likely have difficulty
verifying whether actual portfolio risk was commensurate with their desired
levels, and whether actual portfolio returns were in line with benchmark
returns. In other words, the two key measures, risk and return, are not
readily available to consumers when deciding whether to seek advice or
switch advisors. The right panel of Figure 10.1 shows how portfolio risk
targeted by individual investors (A = low risk, E = high risk) and actual
portfolio risk (standard deviation of actual portfolio returns of these invest-
ors) compare to each other under a specific advisory model offered by
Financial Institution 2 (and examined by Bhattacharya et al., 2012a). The
advisors of Financial Institution 2 determine target risk categories together
with their clients and then recommend portfolios that match these risk
preferences. In principle, a financial institution could report matches ex
post, in order to demonstrate the high quality of its advisory services with
regard to portfolio risk management.
We have also conducted an online survey of consumer preferences
regarding investment advice, where we find that an advisor’s proven ability
to manage portfolio risk according to target risk is the number one criter-
ion when selecting advisors. We also tested alternative ways to measure and
report portfolio risk, and we concluded that the ordering of retail port-
folios according to historical riskiness was hardly affected by the choice of
specific risk measure. Furthermore, we found that risk reporting to con-
sumers must be as simple as possible (e.g., a scale from 1 to 10 that maps
standard deviations of portfolio returns) and highly standardized in order
to be meaningful. These results are incorporated into a recent report to the
German Department of Consumer Protection, which has recommended
enhancing market transparency by giving retail investors legal right to
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Figure 10.1 Comparison of stated risk preferences and average actual portfolio risk.
Panel A: Risk categories for target portfolio risk (Financial Institution 1); Panel B:
Risk categories for target portfolio risk (Financial Institution 2)
Notes : Panel A shows average annual standard deviations of portfolio returns for approximately
14,000 self-directed clients of Financial Institution 1 for the time period January 2007 to
December 2008. Panel B shows average annual standard deviations of returns of portfolios
recommended to some 400 advisory clients of Financial Institution 2 for the time period May
2009 to April 2010. The ordinal categories on the horizontal axis in each panel indicate the
preferred risk levels as stated by the clients. Portfolios in Category 1 (A) are typically referred to
as ‘conservative’ portfolios and those from Category 5 (E) are typically referred to as ‘specula-
tive’ portfolios. Reading example: The portfolio returns of self-directed clients of Financial
Institution 1 who reported ex ante that they target risk level 2 (‘moderate risk’) had an average
standard deviation p.a. of 21.5 percent in 2007 and 2008.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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obtain (at reasonable cost) their own detailed portfolios and transaction
data in a unified electronic format that would allow third-party intermedi-
aries to calculate standard measures for past portfolio risk and return,
and to compare those to appropriate benchmarks (Hackethal and Inderst,
2011). While such a policy intervention would only target consumers
already sophisticated enough to see the potential benefits of having such
measures at their disposal, it could generate a much-needed stimulus in the
market for financial advice simply by generating the potential for better
transparency.
Conclusion
Our review of the marketplace for financial advice informs policy discus-
sion of how to make this market work better. Most consumers are not well
prepared to make complex financial decisions, so professional financial
advice is likely to be a promising remedy. In practice, professional advice is
widespread, yet the welfare impacts of such advice appear to be neutral, at
best. For policymakers, the main problem seems to be advisor incentive
schemes coupled with opaque product information. Yet pure supply side
measures and mandatory disclosure of conflicts of interest are insufficient
to ensure stronger competition for high-quality advice, as well as better
adherence to good advice. Instead, more transparency is needed regarding
the outcomes rather than the inputs of advisor recommendations. Easy-to-
digest reports on one’s own portfolio risk and return profile, in conjunc-
tion with a standardized categorization of past return variation, might
induce advisors and consumers to pay more attention to individual target
risk and actual portfolio risk. Such outcome transparency would allow
advisors to demonstrate their abilities to meet their main value-added
task, namely matching portfolios with consumer preferences.
Endnotes
1. In fact, consumers may not adequately distinguish between these different
sources of advice, despite the different fiduciary duties that are imposed
(Hung et al., 2008).
2. See, e.g., Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004).
3. The most comprehensive survey studies of this are Chater et al. (2010) and
Eurobarometer (EC, 2012) (with a European focus).
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4. For an authoritative survey on the field of behavioral finance, see Barberis and
Thaler (2003). Chater et al. (2010) offer a more policy-oriented overview,
applied to retail investment services.
5. For a survey, see Barber and Odean (2011).
6. Kahneman (2011) distinguishes in his stylized description of human decision-
making between an automatic, fast, and emotional System 1 that generates
intuition, and an effortful, slow, and somewhat lazy System 2 that processes
information more thoroughly than System 1 to either endorse (‘rationalize’) or
refute (‘disbelieve’) intuition. Systematic errors in decision-making can there-
fore be the result of incorrect intuition unfettered by System 2 or they can be
the result of interventions by an unskilled System 2 (see next section). Kahne-
man proposes two complementary instruments to improve individual decision-
making. The first is to involve others to exert better control over one’s own
System 1 and at the same time to enhance the capabilities of one’s own System
2. The second instrument is to establish a general but distinctive vocabulary that
aids in identifying and overcoming judgment errors. Professional financial
advice can be viewed as a variant of Instrument 1. At the end of Section 4, we
propose a variant of Instrument 2, namely a standardized vocabulary to better
deal with desired and actual portfolio risk.
7. See Lusardi and Mitchell (2007).
8. The UK’s Personal Finance Research Center has recently carried out a study on
these evaluations (FSA, 2008). On the other hand, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007)
find a positive impact of financial education in school a decade beyond
graduation.
9. Across European countries and across products the source of advice varies
considerably, with bank employees playing a key role in many continental
European countries.
10. See www.ibisworld.com/industry/default.aspx?indid=1316. See also Turner
and Muir (2013).
11. See Hackethal et al. (2012) and Van Rooij et al. (2011).
12. Interestingly, for more educated consumers—and for consumers who consider
financial decisions to be less complex—it is their confidence in consumer
protection that is a key determinant of their willingness to hold risky assets.
For less educated consumers—and for consumers who consider financial deci-
sions to be more complex—trust in consumer protection matters less.
13. See Hung et al. (2008).
14. Even when subjects are informed about a conflict of interest, this knowledge
does not seem to always make them sufficiently wary (cf. the various experi-
ments discussed in Chater et al., 2010).
15. See other chapters: Hung and Yoong (2013); Finke (2013); Turner and Muir
(2013); and Zick and Mayer (2013).
16. Inderst andOttaviani (2009, 2011) introduce suchmultiple tasks into models of
advice.
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17. Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b) introduce a simple mode of advice and provide a
detailed formal discussion of mandatory disclosure policies.
18. Seru et al. (2010) also show that learning effects are small after controlling for
investor attrition.
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